Department of Defense to create stability in unstable sovereign states and regions for the sake of U.S. national interests. This project identifies the necessity to understand the strategic environment before the USG applies limited resources to improve the security, economic, and governance conditions that can stabilize a state or region. The development and use of a comprehensive strategic stabilization assessment model readily enables the USG to understand the proximate causes of a sovereign state's instability. Once understood, the USG can correctly apply the appropriate "ways" with minimal "means" to achieve the necessary "ends" of stability.
GLOBAL STABILITY THROUGH SECURITY COOPERATION
"Shaping through theater security cooperation… making our partners more capable today makes them better allies tomorrow. Investing in our partner nations' readiness by building their capacity helps to shape the future of the region." terrorism, illicit smuggling of weapons, narcoterrorism, a global economic crisis, and many more international challenges must redefine its approach to global engagement ensuring the protection of its national interests. This project explores the opportunities that "unified action" presents while incorporating a "whole-of-government" approach to better shape, stabilize, and facilitate the reconstruction of partnered sovereign states in a more efficient and resourceful manner at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
By dissecting published national guidance, Congressionally mandated authorities, past and present Department of Defense and Department of State planning practices, and the cost/benefit analysis of programmed "shaping" monies; this project will highlight interagency challenges and propose alternative "ways" to use limited "means" to achieve strategic "ends."
The short-term, but to gain stability, the United States must apply a "whole-of-government" approach. As President Obama states, "Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented. Our security also depends upon diplomats who can act in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; development experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice systems, and work seamlessly with other countries." 6 The U.S. Army's Stability Operations manual defines a "whole-of-government" approach as "an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government (USG) to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal." 7 In this case, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State because those states possess the inability "to police themselves effectively or to work with their neighbors to ensure regional security." 9 Extremists represent challenges to the international system and to our national security interests.
"If left unchecked, such instability can spread and threaten regions of interest to the United States, our allies, and friends. Insurgent groups and other non-state actors frequently exploit local geographical, political, or social conditions to establish safe havens from which they can operate with impunity. Ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas offer fertile ground for such groups to exploit the gaps in governance capacity of local regimes to undermine local stability and regional security."
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The DoD within the National Defense Strategy identified five key objectives providing enduring security for the American people. The two key objectives that will "check" the above-mentioned state instability issues are "Promote Security" and "Deter Conflict."
Both objectives focus their respective energies on strengthening and expanding alliances and partnerships.
Recognizing that our "allies often possess capabilities, skills, and knowledge we cannot duplicate," we must reach out to them and "broaden our ideas to include partnerships for new situations or circumstances, calling on moderate voices in troubled regions and unexpected partners." 11 Through the conduct of a comprehensive assessment of a nation's security capacity and capabilities, the Geographical Combatant Commander (GCC) must determine if the nation's military is capable of conducting "missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, or complex counterinsurgency and high-end conventional operations.'' 12 The more complex the military operation, the fewer partners exist with the capacity, will, and capability to act in support of our mutual goals. The assessment will ideally drive future "security cooperation" considerations with the partner country. As per Joint Publication 1, "Security cooperation involves all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for selfdefense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a region. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations." 13 The National Defense Strategy focuses on the use of "security cooperation" programs to build partnerships that strengthen the host nation's ability to confront security challenges. Security cooperation, the principal medium for building security capacity, supports these sovereign states by:
"1) Encouraging partner nations to assume lead roles in areas that represent the common interests of the United States and the host nation;
2) Encouraging partner nations to increase their capability and willingness to participate in a coalition with U.S. forces; and "To initially respond to the dangers presented by fragile states with a clear civilian mission: prevent conflict, save lives, and build sustainable peace by resolving underlying grievances fairly and helping to build government institutions that can provide basic but effective security and justice systems. Over the longer term, our mission is to build a government's ability to address challenges, promote development, protect human rights, and provide for its people on its own. To meet this responsibility, we need clearly designated, accountable leadership within and between State and USAID, as well as complementary capabilities in each agency." 17 The most essential complementary capability is that of security, which the DoD provides directly by employing its forces or via its security cooperation program in concert with and under the direction of the DoS. On December 7, 2005, the President of the United
States directed that the DoS take the lead for all "Reconstruction and Stabilization" efforts, as stated in the National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44. 18 NSPD-44 proclaims that "the United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies." clearly depict that the DoD will assume the primary role in unified action to "synchronize, coordinate, and/or integrate joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG agencies, non-governmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the United Nations), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort." 26 It is through "unified action" and the interagency relationships that the Departments of State and Defense's planners collaboratively construct a synergistic stabilization strategy for conflicted sovereign states and regions.
Ideally, the first step is to understand the environment prior to the creation of a strategy, which positively affects the outcome or end conditions. To ensure the stabilization of a country or region, the decision-maker must understand in totality the underlying causes that either allows the respective country to remain in a stable (steady-state) condition or the proximate causes of its instability. Decision-makers must provide guidance to their planners with a full contextual understanding of the concerns or problems addressed in a strategy. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to determine the "ways" and "means" required to establish or reestablish the "ends" for stability in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) world, without the complete appreciation of the strategic environment.
Given future impending budget constraints, it is imperative to identify correctly the proximate causes of a state's stability problems and effectively apply measures to rectify the state's ailments with limited resources. With limited funding and time,
organizations must approach problems with vigor and preciseness to achieve its ends.
When multiple organizations participate to achieve the same ends, the process becomes more difficult given the cooperation, coordination, collaboration, and consensus required between these organizations. The aforementioned guidance in the national strategy documents to engage the world and create stability that in the end protects our national security interests is the foundation and motivation to build a successful engagement strategy. NSPD-44, NDAA 2009, and DoDI 3000.05 mandate a lawful unity of effort between the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the USAID given its congressionally acknowledged development expertise. Together the three organizations collaborate, coordinate, and cooperate to achieve the stability of a sovereign state and region. This collaboration, coordination, and cooperation require a unity of purpose and reading from the "same sheet of music." The requirement for three distinct organizations to operate together and be on the same "sheet of music" must demand a strategic, comprehensive assessment model that provides analysis for each nation and within a given geographic region.
Currently no strategic, comprehensive assessment model exists within the DoD, DoS, or USAID. However, each organization, at various levels and locations, possesses assessment tools, which enables the decision-makers to select options. There exists decision-makers within each organization, which use no criteria other than their respective experiences and intuition to apply resources at the right place and time.
Arguably, neither approach in a VUCA world, with little continuity between rotating leadership/decision-makers, and mandated teamwork/unity of effort will be consistently effective over time. In the age of limited resources and the advancement of U.S.
national security interests, one would hope that the requisite collaboration to develop an interagency standardized assessment model may occur sooner versus later.
The question becomes why has the USG failed to develop an interagency model to assess worldwide stability? It makes sense from a resource standpoint to develop an assessment model as it would provide our decision-makers a more accurate method to apply the appropriate "ways" with justified "means" to resolve problems and obtain the his command must conduct. The GCCs' ability to conduct successful day-to-day Phase 0 "shaping" operations will determine the necessity of other follow-on phases. Ideally, the joint, multinational, and interagency "shape" phase activities "are performed in such a manner to dissuade or deter adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies." 31 Security cooperation activities are the ways (tools) that the GCCs depend on to affect the stability environment of a country or region. These ways are effective if applied correctly. Today's cause for concern is the difficulty of applying security cooperation activities in a timely, effective, and efficient manner. The cumbersome and bureaucratic process and the lack of a standardized assessment model make security cooperation activities less effective.
In both the DoD's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the DoS's 2010
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, each respective secretary captures the crux of the problem as the interagency's inability to plan strategically and make optimal use of all national instruments of power. Secretary Gates proclaims, "the complexity of 21st century conflicts demands that the U.S. government significantly improve interagency 'comprehensive assessments,' analysis, planning, and execution for whole-of-government operations, including systems to monitor and evaluate those operations in order to advance U.S. national interests." 32 Secretary Clinton identifies numerous requirements that her department must address to maximize sound policy decisions with the right stakeholders who would include longer-term strategic planning and budgeting. 33 Her concept to "work with the National Security Staff and our interagency partners toward a national security budgeting process that would allow policymakers and lawmakers to see the whole of our national security priorities" 34 is
original. This idea serves as a "whole-of-government" forcing function to make the assessment, planning, budgeting, and accountability process more transparent and ideally increase interagency effectiveness and efficiency to execute stabilization and security cooperation activities in a timely manner.
To fully grasp the complexity of the process an understanding of who the actors are is essential to effective participation in the process. NSPD-44 established a National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee (NSC/PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization of which the chairperson for this respective NSC/PCC is the Department of State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). 35 The purpose of the NSC/PCC is to provide policy oversight and approval of initiatives as they pertain to reconstruction and stabilization efforts throughout the world.
The S/CRS wasted no time in taking the lead to create an interagency framework for planning and coordinating United States reconstruction and stabilization operations.
In March 2007, the NSC approved two of the three elements of the framework: 1) "the Interagency Management System (IMS) for managing high-priority and highly complex crisis and operations, and 2) procedures for initiating government-wide planning, including the IMS and the planning guide." 36 The third element, "a guide for planning specific reconstruction and stabilization operations was not approved by the NSC as it required additional coordination within the 16 agency workgroup, to include the DoD, to reach a consensus on how best to plan strategically. 37 Upon review of the planning guide's principles, it appears to follow a DoD approach.
"The planning guide divides planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations into three levels: policy formulation, strategy development, and implementation planning. As currently envisioned, the guide states that goals and objectives at each level should be achievable; have well-defined measures for determining progress; and have goals, objectives, and planned activities that are clearly linked." The DoD can enhance the security cooperation process by providing direct assistance to the DoS. This direct assistance will assist the DoS refine their strategic planning process. By assigning combat-seasoned, strategic-thinking, campaign design experienced DoD officers to the DoS, both could team aggressively together in the development of a standardized, comprehensive, strategic, stabilization assessment model. Such a model previously mentioned in this project, must be collaborative and ideally approved by the National Security Council to gain legitimacy in the eyes of all participants. Global stability in a resource-constrained world requires the USG to think "outside-the-box" to develop acceptable "ways" using feasible "means" to achieve suitable "ends." Thoroughly understanding today's strategic VUCA environment is the first step. 
